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This note aims to maximize the reliability of presidential power scores for a larger 
number of countries and time periods than currently exists for any single measure 
and in a way that is replicable and easy to update. We begin by identifying all of the 
studies that have estimated the effect of a presidential power variable, clarifying 
what scholars have attempted to capture when they have operationalized the 
concept of presidential power. We then identify all of the measures of presidential 
power that have been proposed over the years, noting the problems that are 
associated with them. To generate our new set of presidential power scores, we 
draw upon the comparative and local knowledge embedded in existing measures of 
presidential power. Employing principal component analysis together with the 
expectation maximization algorithm and maximum likelihood estimation, we 
generate a set of presidential power scores for a larger set of countries and country 
time periods than currently exists, reporting 95 per cent confidence intervals and 
standard errors for the scores. Finally, we discuss the implications of the new set of 
scores for future studies of presidential power. 
 
Estimating the effect of presidential power 
 
There is now a large body of work that has estimated the outcome of variation in 
presidential power. To identify studies of presidential power systematically, we 
searched a selection of leading comparative politics journals. Using the term 
‘presidential power variable’, we searched the American Journal of Political Science, 
American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative 
Political Studies, Comparative Politics, European Journal of Political Research, 
International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, and 
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World Politics. All articles published to the end of 2011 that included an estimation 
with a presidential power variable were recorded. These articles were also consulted 
to identify whether or not they referred to other books or journal articles that might 
include such an estimation. In total, 49 studies that included an estimation of 
presidential power were identified.1 In all but four of these studies presidential 
power was operationalized explicitly or implicitly as an explanatory variable. In 
these 45 studies, the dependent variable ranged widely across topics such as 
economic reform; democratic consolidation; the level of protectionism; the effective 
number of parties; cabinet composition; voter turnout; and many others. In 30 of 
these 45 studies, variation in presidential power was confirmed to have a significant 
effect on the outcome under investigation. 
What are scholars trying to capture when they estimate the effect of 
presidential power? In 11 of the 49 studies we identified, scholars focused on only a 
specific aspect of presidential power. For example, Cheibub wished to explain 
variation in budget balances in democratic systems.2 Consistent with his focus, he 
operationalized a presidential power variable, but only in terms of the president’s 
power over budgetary policy and the president’s veto power rather than 
presidential power generally. Thus, when scholars wish to test a particular theory of 
presidential power, there is evidence that they have estimated the effects of only the 
specific elements of presidential power relating to that theory. 
In the remaining cases, though, scholars stated that they wished to estimate 
the effect of presidential power generally. A very small number of scholars were 
                                                
1 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
2 Cheibub 2006 
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more precise about what they understood by this term. For example, Biglaiser and 
DeRouen stated that they were trying to capture “centralized executive authority”.3 
Hicken and Stoll understood presidential power to be “the degree to which power is 
concentrated in the presidency within the national level of government”.4 Most 
scholars, though, stated only that they were interested in the effects of a general 
term such as presidential power or powers, presidential strength, presidential 
authority, executive power, executive authority, or an equivalent term. While there 
could be semantic differences between these terms, there is no discussion of such 
differences. Scholars have been using them synonymously. With regard to the terms 
presidential power and executive power, there were studies that used the terms 
presidential power and executive power as direct synonyms.5 However, there were 
studies that estimated the effect of variation in the level of constraints on the 
executive in the system of checks and balances. They operationalized Polity’s 
XCONST variable or Henisz’s POLCON variable.6 There were also studies where 
scholars estimated both a presidential power variable and the XCONST executive 
constraints variable separately.7 In short, scholars were able to distinguish 
presidential power from executive constraints more broadly. We excluded studies 
that estimated solely the effect of executive constraints. 
                                                
3 Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004, 567 
4 Hicken and Stoll 2008, 1110 
5 Roper 2002, 253; Clark and Wittrock 2005, 475 and 479 
6 We excluded studies that estimated the effect of constraints on the executive from the start using 
XCONST and POLCON. So, they are not counted in the 49 studies we identified. 
7 For example, Doyle 2010 
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Overall, we identified 38 studies where scholars tried to estimate the impact 
of presidential power generally. They used different terms to refer to this 
phenomenon, but we can be confident that whatever term they used they were 
trying to capture the extent to which the presidency was a powerful actor within the 
national government, rather than either some specific power of the institution or the 
position of the executive within the system of checks and balances more broadly. 
 
Existing measures of presidential power 
 
How have scholars tried to estimate the impact of presidential power generally? A 
number of the 38 studies we identified drew up a discrete measure of presidential 
power with cross-national country scores. Most studies, though, relied on a measure 
that had been drawn up by other scholars whose sole aim was to generate a set of 
presidential power scores rather than to estimate the empirical effect of variation in 
the scores. These measures were often available only either in specialist journals or 
in online datasets. Therefore, to identify the full set of presidential power measures 
that have been proposed over the years, it was necessary to move beyond a search 
of leading journals. To that end, a separate Google Scholar search was conducted 
using terms such as ‘presidential power measure’ and ‘index of presidential power’. 
We identified 19 separate and original measures of presidential power,8 plus a 
further 16 studies that used one of these measures but both/either reported scores 
                                                
8 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
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for a different set of countries and/or gave countries different scores from the 
original study.9 Thus, we have a dataset of 35 measures of presidential power. 
The methodology used across the 35 measures is relatively consistent. The 
measures are all based on a set of individual indicators of presidential power. Often, 
the indicators are binary. If a president enjoys a particular power, then a value of 1 
is assigned for that indicator. Otherwise, a value of 0 is recorded. Sometimes the 
indicators are ordinal. For example, Shugart and Carey propose ten indicators of 
presidential power with each indicator having a range of 0-4.10 Presidents are then 
awarded a score within this range for each indicator. Whether the indicator scores 
are binary or ordinal, the total score for presidential power is invariably the 
aggregate of the scores for each indicator. This generates a set of cross-national 
presidential power scores for particular time periods. 
While there are now many different measures of presidential power, there 
are empirical and theoretical problems with them. First, while none of the measures 
aimed to capture the personal power of individual presidents, the measures did 
capture two different manifestations of presidential power. Some were derived 
solely from constitutional indicators of presidential power, whereas others were 
based on a mix of constitutional and behavioral power, meaning the power of the 
presidency in “actual political practice”.11 There are problems with measuring the 
constitutional powers of presidents because constitutions can be imperfect measures 
of actual political power. However, there are also problems with measuring the 
                                                
9 A full list of these studies is available in the online material. 
10 Shugart and Carey 1992 
11 Siaroff 2003, 303 
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behavioral power of presidents because there is the risk of capturing the impact of 
factors such as party competition, rather than the power of the presidency itself. 
Second, there is great variation in the country coverage of the different 
studies as well as the time periods that were covered. Only three of the 35 measures 
covered a large number of countries across political regimes generally.12 Some 
focused on only one particular region, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, or Africa. Others selected on the basis of a different 
analytical criterion. For example, Tavits reports the scores for 23 countries but only 
those with weak presidencies.13 What is more, scholars have now been proposing 
presidential powers scores for nearly 20 years. However, these scores are not 
updated after publication. Given that constitutions are often amended, reported 
presidential power scores can soon go out of date. This means that countries 
sometimes cannot be reliably included in an estimation even if a presidential power 
score for that country exists. 
Finally, there are problems of construct validity. Fortin has shown that the 
indicators of any given measure of presidential power are not necessarily capturing 
a single latent construct.14 She performed factor analysis on a dataset that pooled 
Shugart and Carey’s presidential power scores with Frye, Hellman and Tucker’s 
scores.15 These scores are based on ten indicators of presidential power, capturing 
two different dimensions, one relating to the president’s executive powers with four 
indicators and another relating to the president’s legislative powers with six 
                                                
12 Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003; Johannsen 2002 
13 Tavits 2008 
14 Fortin 2013 
15 Shugart and Carey 1992; Hellman and Tucker 2000 
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indicators. However, Fortin found that seven of the ten indicators cluster into a 
single factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 and “with no evidence of separate 
latent constructs for legislative and non-legislative powers”.16 She also pointed out 
that the process of aggregating the scores for the individual indicators is 
problematic. She states: “[a]ggregation produces homogeneity claims, meaning that 
equal scores are substitutable or equivalent”.17 However, she noted that “each score 
can be obtained through broad combinations of different powers, and should thus 
not be considered homogenous in terms of causal analyses”.18 She goes on to argue 
that for any given measure “not all items hypothesized to capture the concept of 
presidential power seem to matter equally in accounting for composite scores” and 
that “not all potentially relevant items were tested”.19 She concludes that existing 
indices of presidential power have “limited validity”.20 
 
Generating a new set of presidential power scores 
 
We resist the temptation to construct a new measure of presidential power from 
scratch. Fortin’s study shows that any measure of presidential power is likely to 
suffer from a basic problem of construct validity.21 We agree with her analysis, but 
note that most social science concepts, including voter turnout, social equality, and 
                                                
16 Fortin 2013, 97 
17 Fortin 2013,107 
18 Fortin 2013,107 
19 Fortin 2013,108 
20 Fortin 2013,108 
21 Fortin 2013 
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corruption suffer from equivalent problems of construct validity. For that reason, 
we prefer to place the emphasis on the reliability of the data that underpins the 
concept we are trying to capture. Specifically, we wish to avail of the expert 
information embedded in existing measures, but in a way that generates a more 
reliable set of cross-national presidential power scores. 
To maximize the reliability of our new set of scores, three elements are 
emphasized. First, we focus solely on measures that record the constitutional power 
of presidents. To be sure, constitutions can be sometimes imperfect indicators of 
presidential power, but the overall reliability of our new set of measures is increased 
by referring solely to information in publicly available documents than by including 
essentially contestable judgments about presidential power in practice. Five of the 
35 measures of presidential power that we identified provided scores for the 
behavioral power of presidents.22 Excluding them leaves 30 measures. For the 
purposes of our methodology, two measures of constitutional presidential power 
that scored only a single country were also excluded, leaving a database of 28 
measures from which to generate our new set of scores. 
Second, we wish to draw upon all of the expert information in these 28 
studies, but we wish to generate new scores in a way that indicates their general 
reliability. This allows researchers to make a decision as to whether to include 
particular countries in any estimation of presidential power. Therefore, standard 
                                                
22 See the online materials for a full list. 
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errors and 95 per cent confidence intervals are reported for each of our presidential 
power scores.23 
Third, we wish to maximize the reliability of our scores by accounting for 
systematic variation between the 28 measures of presidential power and so reducing 
the impact of any idiosyncratic measures. To do so, principal-component analysis 
(PCA) is employed. If certain measures are found to vary systematically from 
others, then it is possible to adjust for the relative importance of those measures 
when generating our new presidential power scores. 
To begin, we identify the time period covered by the presidential power score 
for all of the different countries in each of the 28 original datasets. There can be more 
than one time period for a given country. For example, there are two time periods 
for Albania, 1991-1997 inclusive and 1998-2012 inclusive. These periods correspond 
to the first post-communist constitution that came into force in 1991 and the new 
constitution that was promulgated in 1998. Eight of our 28 datasets recorded a 
presidential power score for Albania for the 1991-1997 period and three for the later 
period. Overall, there are scores for a total of 116 countries and 181 country time 
periods. There was a maximum of four time periods for a number of countries, 
including Chile and Slovakia, and a maximum of 17 presidential power scores for 
one country time period, namely Romania 1991-2012. The mean number of scores 
per country time period was 2.7, the modal category was one score for 54 country 
                                                
23 We calculate the confidence intervals and standard errors on the basis of the raw scores  (before 
normalization). They provide a measure of the degree of certainty among the constituting measures. 
Their primary purpose is to provide researchers with an easy way of establishing whether a given 
measure accurately captures a shared understanding of presidential power among researchers for 
that country constitution. 
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time periods, and the median number of scores per country time period was two. 
Therefore, the data is in country time period format. Country scores do not change 
on a yearly basis. They change only when the constitution is amended in a way that 
alters that country’s presidential power score. For example, there are two lines for 
Argentina in the dataset; one for the years 1984-1994 and another for the period 
from 1995 onwards, following the constitutional amendments in August 1994. 
 With information about the time period for each country, the first new 
measure can be calculated (Prespow1). Given that presidential power scores are 
calculated differently across many of the different datasets, each country score in 
each of the 28 datasets was normalized as follows: (x minus minimum possible 
value)/(maximum possible value minus minimum possible value). For example, 
Shugart and Carey recorded a score of 17 for Panama 1972-2012 on their scale from 
0-40.24 Therefore, the Shugart and Carey normalized presidential power score for 
Panama was 0.43 in a range from 0-1. A score for Panama was recorded in four of 
the 28 datasets. The average of these four normalized scores was 0.47, generating a 
raw (Prespow1) measure. The whole set of country scores was then normalized to 
generate a range from 0-1 to facilitate comparison with our second set of scores 
below. The final normalized (Prespow1) score for Panama is 0.45. The full set of raw 
and normalized Prespow1 scores with their standard errors and 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are reported in Appendix 1 Table A.  
To calculate our second new measure, principal component analysis (PCA) 
was employed. This method relies on a correlation or covariance matrix. However, 
there are large gaps in our sample. Any individual measure of presidential power 
                                                
24 Shugart and Carey 1992 
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covers only a specific subset of countries and country years. For example, Shugart 
and Carey may have good coverage of the Americas, but no African countries are 
included. Moreover, Shugart and Carey’s scores were reported as of 1992. As a 
result, their data will only partially overlap with Hicken and Stoll, who code 
presidential power not only for the Americas but also for countries in Asia, Africa 
and Eastern Europe and who also have the opportunity to record scores for more 
recent country years.25 Therefore, before we can apply PCA, the issue of missing data 
needs to be addressed. 
We do this by following the method of analyzing incomplete data suggested 
by Truxillo and performing PCA by using maximum likelihood estimation with the 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm.26 This approach is an alternative to 
multiple imputation and is particularly suited to PCA, for while principal 
components can be explicitly computed, as Chen notes, we can also derive the 
principal components with an EM approach.27 This allows us to use the EM as a 
means to estimate the data we are missing. In essence, this is an iterative procedure, 
which, without explicitly deriving the sample covariance, enables us to determine 
the subspace spanned by the dominant eigenvector.28 The initial step in this 
approach involves computing the maximum likelihood estimates of the mean vector 
and covariance matrix for our set of 28 presidential power measures.29 These 
                                                
25 Hicken and Stoll 2008; Shugart and Carey 1992 
26 Truxillo 2005 
27 Chen 2002, 4.  
28 Chen 2002, 5. 
29 Given our data is in country time period format, the starting year for each country is the year when 
presidential power is first measured in that country’s constitution.   
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estimates are derived from an iterative expectation-maximization algorithm.30 The 
EM algorithm provides estimates of the missing data based on the observed values 
within the dataset, that is, the existing measures of presidential power. In doing so, 
it estimates parameters that take into account any dependencies in the missingness 
among our measures of power.31 So, the Expectation (E) step fills in the gaps in our 
data. The now complete data, including all observed and estimated data points, are 
processed with maximum-likelihood estimation, or the Maximization (M) step. This 
provides the updated mean vector and covariance matrix estimates. This process is 
repeated until the "maximum change in the estimates from one iteration to the next 
does not exceed a convergence criterion".32 That is, with the new data from the M 
step, the E is repeated, followed again by the M step, and so on. This iterative 
process continues until we derive reliable estimates of the missing data matrix.  
With complete data, we can then perform PCA. This method seeks a linear 
combination of potentially correlated variables and extracts the maximum variance 
from them. The resulting principal component (Y1) is weighted by the degree to 
which each original variable explains the variance in the underlying orthogonal 
dimension.33 That is,  
Y1 = a11X1 + a12X2 + ... +a1pXp   
Each of the 28 measures of presidential power can be treated as a separate variable. 
Using PCA, a single presidential power score can be generated for each country 
                                                
30 Truxillo 2005, 3; see the website for the full code.  
31 Truxillo 2005, 3. 
32 Truxillo 2005, 3; for the EM algorithm more generally, see McLachlan and Krishnan 1997. 
33 See for example Flury 1988; Jolliffe 2002. 
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time period using the information from all 28 measures.34 The resulting measure is a 
linear weighted construct of all existing power measures.35 Using this technique, we 
can control for variation across the 28 measures of presidential power, reducing the 
impact of idiosyncratic measures on the final presidential power score that we 
report. This method allows us to weight the contribution of each existing measure of 
presidential power. Thus, the Prespow2 scores are a linear construct of all existing 
presidential power variables, which are weighted by their rotated component scores.36 
These scores capture the underlying variance explained by each measure of power. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is quite high, lending 
credence to our low-dimensional representation of presidential power. In a final 
step, the raw scores are normalized to generate a range from 0-1. The full set of raw 
and normalized prespow2 scores with their standard errors and 95 per cent 
confidence intervals is reported in Appendix 1 Table B. 
                                                
34 We use the command pcamat in Stata 13. This allows the covariance matrix C to be specified as a k x 
k symmetric matrix. We also avoid biased estimates by specifying the column-wise minimum n as 
suggested by Truxillo 2005.  
35 If our data exhibits serial dependence, then this will undermine the assumptions needed to perform 
PCA on longitudinal data (for example, Wansbeek and Meijer 2000). However, our raw data is in 
country time period format, meaning that we do not perform PCA with a long time series, which is 
where we are most likely to find this type of auto-correlation. In fact, the results of a Wooldridge test 
for serial correlation indicates that this is not an issue for our data (see Drukker 2003). Nonetheless, 
as a further robustness test, we also performed a dynamic PCA with panel data. Please see the online 
material for more detail on this analysis. The result of the dynamic PCA model has a correlation with 
Prespow2 of over 0.93. 
36 As part of this process, each measure of presidential power is standardized with mean 0 and 
variance 1. 
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Discussion 
 
A set of presidential power scores has been generated for a greater number of 
countries and country years than any existing dataset. By accounting for the 
idiosyncrasies of existing measures, the reliability of our set of scores relative to any 
existing measure has been maximized. By using publicly available measures, our 
method is replicable. It is also easy to include new measures of presidential power 
and generate updated scores. If scholars wish to test a particular theoretical 
proposition about a certain aspect of presidential power, such as veto power or 
decree power, then they should construct their own measure and estimate its effect.37 
However, if scholars wish to examine the effect of presidential power generally, 
there is great benefit to be gained from the scores we have generated. With this aim 
in mind, two points should be emphasized. 
First, for both of our measures standard errors and 95 per cent confidence 
intervals for each country time period have been reported. This allows the basic 
reliability of any individual score to be identified, meaning that scholars can make 
an informed choice about whether or not to include a country in their estimation. 
For example, there are only two original scores for Cyprus (1960-) and both are very 
different. The normalized Hicken and Stoll score is 0.325, while for Shugart it is 1.38 
Cyprus is the only presidential system in Europe. Therefore, the relatively high 
scores for Cyprus in the Appendices might be considered to have good face validity 
                                                
37 We would like to thank Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo for drawing our attention to this important point. 
38 Hicken and Stoll 2008; Shugart 1996 
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(Prespow1 = 0.64, Prespow2 = 0.70). However, the Tables in the Appendix show that 
the confidence intervals for Cyprus are very large, reflecting the differences in the 
original measures. The way that the scores have been generated and reported gives 
scholars the opportunity to decide whether or not to include Cyprus in any 
estimation. Some may wish to include it because of what they might consider to be 
good face validity. Others may wish to exclude it because of the large confidence 
intervals. We make no recommendation, but we provide the grounds on which 
scholars can make an informed choice. 
Second, we also provide the grounds on which scholars can decide which set 
of scores to use in comparative analysis. Figure 1 compares the range of standard 
errors for the Prespow1 and Prespow2 scores for the different regions. It suggests 
that the Prespow2 scores increase the range of the standard errors for Latin 
America, but decrease it for both Africa and Asia. The effect on the scores for 
presidents in European countries is minimal. This suggests that scholars wanting to 
estimate the effect of presidential power solely in Latin America might wish to use 
the Prespow1 scores. However, scholars wanting to estimate the effect of 
presidential power solely in Africa might wish to use the Prespow2 scores. Scholars 
who wanted to estimate the effect of presidential power across all regions might also 
wish to use the Prespow2 scores, because on balance the reliability of the whole set 
of scores is probably slightly greater, even if the range of the standard errors in 
Latin America is increased. Again, we make no firm recommendation because the 
choice will be sensitive to the focus of the particular study. However, we provide 
information with which the scholar can make an informed decision. 
Figure 1 about here 
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Conclusion  
 
By pooling the comparative and local knowledge present in 28 existing measures, 
we have generated a new set of presidential power scores for a larger number of 
countries and a longer time series than before. We have also maximized the 
reliability of these scores by deriving them solely from measures based on 
constitutional indicators of presidential power and by using a method that accounts 
for the idiosyncrasies of country scores in existing measures. By reporting the 
standard errors and the confidence intervals for individual country time periods in 
our measures, we have also provided information with which scholars can make an 
informed choice about whether or not a particular country should be included in an 
estimation and which of our measures should be used in comparative studies. 
Overall, we encourage people to keep developing new measures of presidential 
power and to update existing measures for as many countries and as long a time 
period as possible. The advantage of our approach is that new country scores can be 
easily incorporated into the method we have used, creating the potential for country 
coverage to be further extended, for existing country scores to be updated, and for 
cross-national measures to become even more reliable. 
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Standard Errors for Prespow1 and Prespow2  
 
 
Note: The thick white lines within each box represent the median. The outside edges of the boxes 
represent the 25% quantile and the 75% quantile. The whiskers report outliers. The hollow circles 
represent data points 1.5 times outside of the interquartile range. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A: Prespow1 Scores 
Country Year Raw score Standard errors 
[95% Confidence 
Intervals for raw 
scores] 
Normalized 
score 
Albania 1991-1998 0.214 0.037 0.127 0.301 0.181 
Albania 1998 0.175 0.027 0.055 0.295 0.141 
Algeria 1997-2008 0.504       0.483 
Angola 1993-2009 0.431       0.408 
Argentina 1984-1994 0.317 0.032 -0.098 0.732 0.288 
Argentina 1994 0.430 0.049 0.294 0.567 0.407 
Armenia 1991-1994 0.436 0.043 0.301 0.571 0.412 
Armenia 1995-2005 0.427 0.060 0.271 0.582 0.403 
Armenia 2006 - 0.664       0.650 
Austria 1945 - 0.128 0.012 0.100 0.156 0.092 
Azerbaijan 1996-2002 0.711 0.070 0.488 0.933 0.699 
Bangladesh 1986 - 0.143       0.107 
Belarus 1994-1996 0.564 0.067 0.399 0.728 0.545 
Belarus 1997 - 0.631 0.094 0.369 0.893 0.615 
Benin 1991 - 0.647 0.179 -0.125 1.419 0.632 
Bolivia 1967-1994 0.317 0.033 -0.098 0.733 0.289 
Bolivia 1995-2008 0.347 0.053 0.179 0.514 0.319 
Bosnia and H 1996 - 0.313 0.188 -2.070 2.695 0.284 
Botswana 1967 - 0.750       0.740 
Brazil 1946-1953 0.475       0.453 
Brazil 1954 - 1960 0.407 0.068 -0.461 1.274 0.382 
Brazil 1988 - 0.507 0.044 0.394 0.619 0.486 
Bulgaria 1990-1991 0.058 0.033 -0.361 0.477 0.018 
Bulgaria 1992 - 0.216 0.044 0.122 0.310 0.183 
Burkina Faso 1978-1980 0.200       0.166 
Burkina Faso 1991-2011 0.375       0.349 
Burundi 1992 - 1996 0.575       0.557 
CAR 1992-1993 0.300       0.271 
CAR 1995-2002 0.413 0.113 -1.017 1.842 0.388 
CAR 2005 - 0.481 0.044 -0.075 1.037 0.460 
Cameroon 1996 - 0.375       0.349 
Cape Verde 1991-1992 0.225       0.193 
Cape Verde 1993 - 0.310 0.066 0.100 0.520 0.281 
Chile 1891-1925 0.400       0.375 
Chile 1925-1969 0.500       0.479 
Chile 1969-1973 0.542 0.058 -0.191 1.275 0.523 
Chile 1989 - 0.587 0.058 0.427 0.747 0.570 
China 1983-2004 0.040       0  
Colombia 1960 - 1990 0.440 0.060 -0.326 1.205 0.416 
Colombia 1991 - 0.406 0.062 0.233 0.578 0.381 
Comoros 1997-1998 0.350       0.323 
Comoros 2002 - 1.000       1.000 
Congo Brazzaville 1961-1963 0.200       0.166 
Congo Brazzaville 1992-1997 0.242 0.068 -0.052 0.535 0.210 
Congo Brazzaville 2002 - 1.000       1.000 
Costa Rica 1949 - 0.312 0.032 0.223 0.402 0.284 
Cote d'Ivoire 1961-1999 0.380       0.354 
Croatia 1991-2000 0.362 0.050 0.250 0.473 0.335 
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Croatia 2001 - 0.319 0.074 0.001 0.637 0.291 
Cuba 1941-1958 0.325       0.297 
Cyprus 1960 - 0.663 0.338 -3.626 4.951 0.648 
Czech Rep 1993-2000 0.177 0.036 0.088 0.266 0.142 
Czech Rep 2001-2011 0.287 0.103 -0.042 0.615 0.257 
Djibouti 1993-2009 1.000       1.000 
Dominican Republic 1967-1994 0.350       0.323 
Dominican Republic 1995-2002 0.424 0.072 0.113 0.735 0.400 
Ecuador 1984-1998 0.388 0.058 0.138 0.638 0.363 
Ecuador 1999-2008 0.578 0.050 0.417 0.738 0.560 
Egypt 1980-2000 0.528       0.509 
El Salvador 1984-2000 0.340 0.063 0.140 0.541 0.313 
El Salvador 2001 - 0.398 0.022 0.125 0.672 0.373 
Estonia 1992 - 0.217 0.032 0.145 0.289 0.184 
Finland 1957 - 1994 0.191 0.009 0.075 0.306 0.157 
Finland 1995-1999 0.196 0.027 0.121 0.271 0.162 
Finland 2000-2011 0.088 0.035 -0.023 0.200 0.050 
France 1963-2008 0.166 0.020 0.117 0.214 0.131 
Gabon 1997-2010 0.434 0.004 0.387 0.481 0.410 
Gambia 1997 - 0.625       0.609 
Georgia 1990-1995 0.200   0.200 0.200 0.166 
Georgia 1996-2003 0.604 0.071 0.430 0.779 0.588 
Georgia 2004 - 0.575       0.557 
Germany 1920-1932 0.400       0.375 
Germany 1946 - 0.068       0.029 
Ghana 1980-1991 0.450       0.427 
Ghana 1992 - 0.458 0.091 0.068 0.849 0.436 
Greece 1986 - 0.068       0.029 
Guatemala 1985 - 0.312 0.061 0.144 0.480 0.283 
Guinea 1992-2009 0.600 0.212 -2.094 3.295 0.584 
Guinea-Bissau 1980 - 0.310 0.015 0.123 0.498 0.281 
Haiti 1987 - 0.104 0.070 -0.196 0.404 0.066 
Honduras 1982 - 0.369 0.010 0.337 0.401 0.343 
Hungary 1991-2011 0.305 0.045 0.200 0.409 0.275 
Iceland 1944 - 0.352 0.079 0.133 0.571 0.325 
India 1950 - 0.098       0.060 
Indonesia 1960-2002 0.069       0.030 
Iran 1990 - 0.158       0.123 
Ireland 1938 - 0.100 0.048 -0.033 0.233 0.062 
Israel 1964 - 0.045       0.005 
Italy 1948 - 0.136       0.100 
Kazakhstan 1990-1992 0.520 0.220 -2.275 3.315 0.500 
Kazakhstan 1993-1995 0.450       0.427 
Kazakhstan 1996 - 0.674 0.080 0.419 0.930 0.661 
Kenya 1998-2007 0.631 0.119 0.119 1.143 0.616 
Kyrgyzstan 1990-1992 0.275   0.275 0.275 0.245 
Kyrgyzstan 1993-1995 0.480 0.089 0.196 0.765 0.459 
Kyrgyzstan 1996-2002 0.505 0.055 0.363 0.647 0.484 
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2007 0.671 0.019 0.430 0.911 0.657 
Latvia 1992-1997 0.168 0.025 0.111 0.225 0.133 
Latvia 1998 - 0.050       0.010 
Lithuania 1993 - 0.311 0.044 0.217 0.405 0.282 
Macedonia 1992 - 0.151 0.031 0.084 0.219 0.116 
Madagascar 1993-1997 0.138 0.088 -0.974 1.249 0.101 
Madagascar 1998-2008 0.431 0.006 0.352 0.511 0.407 
Malawi 1994 - 0.607 0.165 0.082 1.132 0.590 
Mali 1992-2012 0.365 0.094 0.104 0.626 0.339 
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Malta 1965 - 0.182       0.148 
Mauritania 2006-2008 0.469 0.031 0.072 0.866 0.446 
Mauritius 1992 - 0.210 0.103 -1.095 1.515 0.177 
Mexico 1929 - 0.370 0.028 0.280 0.460 0.343 
Moldova 1990 0.260 0.110 -1.140 1.660 0.229 
Moldova 1991-1994 0.316 0.091 -0.843 1.475 0.288 
Moldova 1995-2000 0.270 0.059 0.130 0.410 0.240 
Moldova 2001 - 0.301 0.069 0.004 0.598 0.272 
Mongolia 1992 - 0.322 0.092 -0.075 0.718 0.293 
Mozambique 1987 - 1990 0.318       0.290 
Mozambique 1991-2004 0.381 0.006 0.308 0.453 0.355 
Mozambique 2005 - 0.491 0.099 0.065 0.916 0.469 
Namibia 1990 - 0.410 0.060 0.256 0.563 0.385 
Nicaragua 1987 - 0.427 0.039 0.303 0.550 0.403 
Niger 1993-1995 0.475 0.025 0.157 0.793 0.453 
Niger 2000-2009 0.369 0.069 -0.505 1.242 0.342 
Nigeria 1989-1993 0.313 0.013 0.154 0.471 0.284 
Nigeria 1999 - 0.658 0.170 -0.074 1.391 0.644 
Pakistan 1998-1999 0.344       0.316 
Panama 1972 0.474 0.046 0.326 0.621 0.452 
Paraguay 1968-1991 0.550       0.531 
Paraguay 1992 - 0.301 0.045 0.156 0.446 0.272 
Peru 1980-1992 0.236 0.011 0.101 0.370 0.204 
Peru 1994 - 0.443 0.056 0.263 0.623 0.420 
Philippines 1987 - 0.305 0.095 -0.906 1.515 0.276 
Poland 1990-1992 0.175       0.140 
Poland 1993-1996 0.323 0.051 0.205 0.441 0.295 
Poland 1997 - 0.271 0.044 0.175 0.368 0.241 
Portugal 1976 - 1982 0.294 0.031 -0.103 0.691 0.264 
Portugal 1983 - 0.229 0.016 0.190 0.268 0.197 
Romania 1992 - 0.280 0.033 0.211 0.349 0.250 
Russia 1990-1991 0.150       0.114 
Russia 1992-1993 0.298 0.073 -0.017 0.613 0.269 
Russia 1994 - 0.579 0.056 0.454 0.704 0.561 
STP 1991-2002 0.310 0.015 0.123 0.498 0.281 
STP 2003 - 0.239 0.011 0.094 0.383 0.207 
Senegal 1992-2000 0.413 0.013 0.254 0.571 0.388 
Senegal 2001 - 0.583 0.116 0.084 1.082 0.566 
Seychelles 1993 - 0.625       0.609 
Sierra Leone 1992 - 0.565 0.217 -0.369 1.500 0.547 
Singapore 1995 - 0.210       0.176 
Slovakia 1993-1998 0.207 0.033 0.129 0.284 0.173 
Slovakia 1999-2001 0.082 0.032 -0.322 0.486 0.043 
Slovakia 2002 - 0.222 0.139 -0.376 0.820 0.189 
Slovenia 1992 - 0.153 0.019 0.114 0.193 0.118 
South Africa 1996 - 0.407 0.218 -2.358 3.173 0.383 
South Korea 1949-1959 0.250       0.219 
South Korea 1962-1972 0.450       0.427 
South Korea 1988 - 0.375       0.349 
Sri Lanka 1979 - 0.314 0.086 -0.054 0.683 0.286 
Syria 1973-2011 0.602       0.585 
Taiwan 1995 - 0.300 0.025 -0.018 0.618 0.271 
Tajikistan 1995 - 0.518 0.051 0.387 0.649 0.498 
Tanzania 1995 - 0.469 0.094 -0.722 1.660 0.446 
Timor Leste 2002 - 0.193       0.159 
Togo 2003 - 0.438       0.414 
Trinidad & Tobago 1976 - 0.100       0.063 
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Tunisia 1998 - 2010 0.380       0.354 
Turkey 1983-2007 0.297 0.127 -1.314 1.909 0.268 
Turkey 2008 - 0.182   0.182 0.182 0.148 
Turkmenistan 1992 - 2008 0.675 0.078 0.476 0.875 0.662 
US 1788 - 0.318 0.008 0.222 0.413 0.289 
Uganda 1996 - 0.531 0.126 -0.012 1.075 0.512 
Ukraine 1992-1995 0.420 0.106 0.125 0.715 0.395 
Ukraine 1996-2004 0.463 0.061 0.319 0.606 0.440 
Ukraine 2005-2010 0.356 0.206 -2.264 2.977 0.329 
Ukraine 2011 - 0.486 0.065 0.328 0.644 0.464 
Uruguay 1985 - 0.402 0.020 0.338 0.467 0.377 
Uzbekistan 1993 - 0.659 0.056 0.516 0.802 0.645 
Venezuela 1961 - 1999 0.287 0.039 0.179 0.395 0.257 
Venezuela 2001 - 0.415       0.391 
Yugoslavia 1992-2000 0.235 0.025 -0.083 0.553 0.203 
Zaire 1997-2002 0.304       0.275 
Zambia 1992-1995 0.350       0.323 
Zambia 1996 - 0.625 0.130 0.213 1.038 0.610 
Zimbabwe 1991-2008 0.752 0.189 -0.061 1.565 0.742 
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Table B: Prespow2 Scores 
Country Year Raw score Standard errors 
[95% Confidence 
Intervals for raw 
scores] 
Normalized 
score 
Albania 1991-1998 -0.181 0.038 -0.270 -0.091 0.215 
Albania 1998 -0.203 0.116 -0.704 0.298 0.185 
Algeria 1997-2008 0.271      0.813 Angola 1993-2009 0.041      0.509 Argentina 1984-1994 -0.069 0.078 -1.059 0.921 0.363 
Argentina 1994 0.052 0.047 -0.078 0.182 0.523 
Armenia 1991-1994 0.161 0.021 0.094 0.228 0.668 
Armenia 1995-2005 0.087 0.046 -0.030 0.204 0.570 
Armenia 2006 - 0.020       0.480 
Austria 1945 - -0.082 0.021 -0.131 -0.033 0.346 
Azerbaijan 1996-2002 0.323 0.056 0.144 0.502 0.882 
Bangladesh 1986 - -0.207       0.180 
Belarus 1994-1996 0.220 0.055 0.086 0.354 0.745 
Belarus 1997 - 0.412 0.059 0.249 0.575 1.000 
Benin 1991 - 0.205 0.030 0.076 0.334 0.725 
Bolivia 1967-1994 -0.069 0.078 -1.059 0.921 0.363 
Bolivia 1995-2008 -0.082 0.019 -0.143 -0.021 0.346 
Bosnia and H 1996 - -0.060 0.087 -1.166 1.047 0.375 
Botswana 1967 - 0.067       0.543 
Brazil 1946-1953 0.089       0.572 
Brazil 1954 - 1960 0.007 0.082 -1.034 1.047 0.463 
Brazil 1988 - 0.181 0.045 0.066 0.295 0.693 
Bulgaria 1990-1991 -0.253 0.078 -1.246 0.740 0.119 
Bulgaria 1992 - -0.122 0.036 -0.199 -0.046 0.293 
Burkina Faso 1978-1980 0.013       0.472 
Burkina Faso 1991-2011 -0.219       0.165 
Burundi 1992 - 1996 -0.020       0.429 
CAR 1992-1993 -0.027       0.419 
CAR 1995-2002 -0.021 0.006 -0.093 0.051 0.427 
CAR 2005 - -0.093 0.078 -1.084 0.897 0.331 
Cameroon 1996 - -0.219       0.165 
Cape Verde 1991-1992 -0.103       0.317 
Cape Verde 1993 - -0.064 0.031 -0.163 0.035 0.370 
Chile 1891-1925 0.041       0.509 
Chile 1925-1969 0.105       0.593 
Chile 1969-1973 0.143 0.025 -0.169 0.456 0.644 
Chile 1989 - 0.293 0.069 0.102 0.485 0.843 
China 1983-2004 -0.343       0 
Colombia 1960 - 1990 0.042 0.063 -0.754 0.837 0.510 
Colombia 1991 - 0.016 0.074 -0.190 0.221 0.475 
Comoros 1997-1998 0       0.454 
Comoros 2002 - 0.257       0.794 
Congo Brazzaville 1961-1963 -0.129       0.283 
Congo Brazzaville 1992-1997 -0.004 0.067 -0.292 0.284 0.449 
Congo Brazzaville 2002 - 0.257       0.794 
Costa Rica 1949 - -0.119 0.041 -0.234 -0.004 0.297 
Cote d'Ivoire 1961-1999 0.106       0.594 
Croatia 1991-2000 0.082 0.025 0.026 0.138 0.563 
Croatia 2001 - -0.062 0.018 -0.139 0.014 0.372 
Cuba 1941-1958 -0.007       0.446 
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Cyprus 1960 - 0.183 0.184 -2.154 2.520 0.697 
Czech Rep 1993-2000 -0.207 0.039 -0.303 -0.112 0.180 
Czech Rep 2001-2011 -0.139 0.087 -0.418 0.139 0.270 
Djibouti 1993-2009 0.257       0.794 
Dominican Republic 1967-
1994 
0.009       0.467 
Dominican Republic 1995-
2002 
0.053 0.033 -0.087 0.193 0.525 
Ecuador 1984-1998 0.056 0.043 -0.130 0.242 0.529 
Ecuador 1999-2008 0.288 0.064 0.084 0.493 0.836 
Egypt 1980-2000 0.303       0.855 
El Salvador 1984-2000 -0.066 0.043 -0.203 0.070 0.367 
El Salvador 2001 - 0.017 0.041 -0.501 0.534 0.476 
Estonia 1992 - -0.212 0.040 -0.303 -0.121 0.174 
Finland 1957 - 1994 0.006 0.092 -1.162 1.174 0.462 
Finland 1995-1999 0.074 0.070 -0.120 0.268 0.553 
Finland 2000-2011 -0.140 0.079 -0.393 0.113 0.269 
France 1963-2008 0.008 0.051 -0.117 0.133 0.465 
Gabon 1997-2010 0.001 0.172 -2.183 2.185 0.455 
Gambia 1997 - -0.029       0.417 
Georgia 1990-1995 -0.104 0.045 -0.672 0.465 0.317 
Georgia 1996-2003 0.251 0.042 0.149 0.354 0.787 
Georgia 2004 - -0.067       0.366 
Germany 1920-1932 0.041       0.509 
Germany 1946 - -0.243       0.133 
Ghana 1980-1991 0.127       0.623 
Ghana 1992 - -0.062 0.058 -0.312 0.187 0.372 
Greece 1986 - -0.243       0.133 
Guatemala 1985 - -0.133 0.056 -0.288 0.023 0.279 
Guinea 1992-2009 0.116 0.002 0.094 0.137 0.608 
Guinea-Bissau 1980 - 0 0.002 -0.030 0.030 0.454 
Haiti 1987 - -0.148 0.065 -0.973 0.676 0.258 
Honduras 1982 - -0.047 0.070 -0.270 0.175 0.392 
Hungary 1991-2011 -0.056 0.058 -0.190 0.077 0.380 
Iceland 1944 - 0.296 0.096 0.030 0.561 0.846 
India 1950 - -0.267       0.102 
Indonesia 1960-2002 -0.305       0.051 
Iran 1990 - -0.187       0.207 
Ireland 1938 - -0.122 0.051 -0.264 0.019 0.293 
Israel 1964 - -0.337       0.008 
Italy 1948 - -0.039       0.403 
Kazakhstan 1990-1992 0.214 0.117 -1.278 1.706 0.738 
Kazakhstan 1993-1995 0.330       0.892 
Kazakhstan 1996 - 0.226 0.015 0.180 0.272 0.754 
Kenya 1998-2007 0.082 0.021 -0.007 0.171 0.564 
Kyrgyzstan 1990-1992 0.031 0.027 -0.316 0.377 0.495 
Kyrgyzstan 1993-1995 0.163 0.043 0.026 0.300 0.670 
Kyrgyzstan 1996-2002 0.213 0.034 0.125 0.300 0.736 
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2007 0.136 0.128 -1.495 1.767 0.634 
Latvia 1992-1997 -0.282 0.021 -0.331 -0.233 0.081 
Latvia 1998 - -0.292       0.067 
Lithuania 1993 - -0.056 0.039 -0.140 0.028 0.380 
Macedonia 1992 - -0.226 0.023 -0.276 -0.175 0.156 
Madagascar 1993-1997 -0.039 0.065 -0.862 0.784 0.403 
Madagascar 1998-2008 -0.089 0.082 -1.135 0.957 0.337 
Malawi 1994 - 0.090 0.060 -0.102 0.282 0.574 
Mali 1992-2012 -0.042 0.040 -0.155 0.070 0.398 
Malta 1965 - 0.098       0.584 
Mauritania 2006-2008 -0.092 0.079 -1.097 0.912 0.333 
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Mauritius 1992 - -0.260 0.006 -0.333 -0.188 0.110 
Mexico 1929 - -0.092 0.065 -0.300 0.115 0.332 
Moldova 1990 -0.159 0.091 -1.311 0.994 0.244 
Moldova 1991-1994 -0.059 0.039 -0.552 0.434 0.376 
Moldova 1995-2000 -0.086 0.052 -0.209 0.037 0.341 
Moldova 2001 - -0.227 0.013 -0.283 -0.170 0.154 
Mongolia 1992 - -0.106 0.066 -0.389 0.177 0.314 
Mozambique 1987 - 1990 0.005       0.461 
Mozambique 1991-2004 0.012 0.014 -0.171 0.195 0.471 
Mozambique 2005 - 0.014 0.011 -0.031 0.060 0.473 
Namibia 1990 - -0.010 0.023 -0.071 0.050 0.441 
Nicaragua 1987 - 0.056 0.036 -0.059 0.171 0.528 
Niger 1993-1995 0.085 0.094 -1.105 1.275 0.567 
Niger 2000-2009 -0.083 0.088 -1.198 1.031 0.344 
Nigeria 1989-1993 -0.003 0.004 -0.049 0.043 0.450 
Nigeria 1999 - 0.082 0.064 -0.194 0.357 0.562 
Pakistan 1998-1999 0.058       0.532 
Panama 1972 0.137 0.033 0.031 0.243 0.636 
Paraguay 1968-1991 0.136       0.635 
Paraguay 1992 - -0.158 0.050 -0.318 0.002 0.245 
Peru 1980-1992 -0.134 0.064 -0.944 0.676 0.277 
Peru 1994 - 0.059 0.073 -0.174 0.292 0.533 
Philippines 1987 - -0.039 0.080 -1.057 0.979 0.403 
Poland 1990-1992 -0.098       0.325 
Poland 1993-1996 0.040 0.064 -0.108 0.188 0.507 
Poland 1997 - -0.008 0.044 -0.105 0.089 0.443 
Portugal 1976 - 1982 0.110 0.116 -1.369 1.588 0.600 
Portugal 1983 - 0.067 0.063 -0.088 0.222 0.543 
Romania 1992 - 0.006 0.034 -0.067 0.079 0.463 
Russia 1990-1991 -0.249       0.124 
Russia 1992-1993 -0.030 0.037 -0.187 0.127 0.415 
Russia 1994 - 0.249 0.037 0.167 0.330 0.784 
STP 1991-2002 0 0.002 -0.030 0.030 0.454 
STP 2003 - -0.008 0.017 -0.218 0.203 0.444 
Senegal 1992-2000 0.081 0.085 -1.001 1.162 0.561 
Senegal 2001 - -0.027 0.080 -0.369 0.316 0.419 
Seychelles 1993 - -0.029       0.417 
Sierra Leone 1992 - 0.114 0.072 -0.195 0.424 0.606 
Singapore 1995 - -0.119       0.297 
Slovakia 1993-1998 -0.190 0.035 -0.273 -0.106 0.203 
Slovakia 1999-2001 -0.195 0.089 -1.321 0.930 0.196 
Slovakia 2002 - -0.106 0.071 -0.411 0.198 0.314 
Slovenia 1992 - -0.215 0.017 -0.252 -0.178 0.169 
South Africa 1996 - -0.087 0.058 -0.830 0.656 0.339 
South Korea 1949-1959 -0.054       0.383 
South Korea 1962-1972 0.073       0.551 
South Korea 1988 - 0.025       0.488 
Sri Lanka 1979 - -0.030 0.089 -0.414 0.354 0.415 
Syria 1973-2011 0.400       0.984 
Taiwan 1995 - -0.052       0.385 
Tajikistan 1995 - 0.106 0.028 0.033 0.178 0.594 
Tanzania 1995 - -0.149 0.073 -1.074 0.777 0.257 
Timor Leste 2002 - -0.035       0.408 
Togo 2003 - -0.171       0.228 
Trinidad & Tobago 1976 - -0.264       0.105 
Tunisia 1998 - 2010 0.106       0.594 
Turkey 1983-2007 0.114 0.051 -0.528 0.756 0.606 
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Turkey 2008 - 0.124 0.014 -0.050 0.298 0.619 
Turkmenistan 1992 - 2008 0.297 0.048 0.175 0.420 0.848 
US 1788 - -0.084 0.077 -1.061 0.893 0.344 
Uganda 1996 - -0.014 0.012 -0.068 0.039 0.436 
Ukraine 1992-1995 0.052 0.089 -0.197 0.300 0.523 
Ukraine 1996-2004 0.165 0.036 0.081 0.249 0.673 
Ukraine 2005-2010 -0.079 0 -0.083 -0.075 0.350 
Ukraine 2011 - 0.192 0.026 0.128 0.256 0.709 
Uruguay 1985 - -0.037 0.039 -0.160 0.087 0.406 
Uzbekistan 1993 - 0.278 0.025 0.215 0.341 0.823 
Venezuela 1961 - 1999 -0.157 0.047 -0.289 -0.025 0.247 
Venezuela 2001 - 0.027       0.490 
Yugoslavia 1992-2000 -0.278 0.001 -0.286 -0.269 0.087 
Zaire 1997-2002 0.006       0.462 
Zambia 1992-1995 0.025       0.487 
Zambia 1996 - 0.117 0.023 0.043 0.192 0.610 
Zimbabwe 1991-2008 0.172 0.044 -0.019 0.362 0.682 
 
 
 
 
